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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
substance of his claims.le On these grounds, the court vacated the
injunction granted below.' 7
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - 10(b) ACION
Another significant decision reached by the Court of Appeals was
Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath.18 In this action based on
alleged violations of sections 9, 9(e), and 10(b) 19 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the district court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff on the ground that his action was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.20 The circuit court of appeals reversed.
The plaintiff maintained that he had employed Auchincloss, Parker
& Redpath to sell twenty shares of Superior Oil of California stock at
the prevailing market price on the New York Stock Exchange. Two days
later, on November 27, 1959, the defendant confirmed sale of the
shares at $1280 per share. The plaintiff later complained that the price
was merely the artificial result of price manipulation by the defendants
in violation of sections 9 and 10(b) of the 1934 Act.21
Suit was commenced on November 24, 1969, almost 10 years after
the alleged fraudulent activities. On this ground and relying on the
built-in statute of limitations of section 9(e),22 the district court dis-
missed the action.
In reversing the district court's determination and remanding the
action of the district court for determination of the merits of the plain-
tiff's case, the court stated that the applicable statute of limitations is
contained in two sections of the N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules.23
The court was in agreement with the district court that the plain-
tiff's section 9 claim was properly dismissed. However, since section
10(b) contains no built-in statute of limitations, it was error to apply
the three-year period of section 9. Rather, the federal court must turn
16 Id.
17 In so vacating, they suggested that the district court assign all of plaintiff's cases to
a single judge who could decide the order of the proceedings so as to expedite their dis-
position. Id.
18 486 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1971).
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78i(e), 78j(b) (1970).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970) provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section,
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and within three years after such violation.
21 The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant claimed that the sale was to a dis-
interested third party at the prevailing market price when in fact, according to the plain-
tiff, the shares were transferred to agents of the defendant, and that the prevailing market
price was more than $1280 per share. 436 F.2d at 340.
22 Supra note 20.
23 N.Y. Cv. PRAc. §§ 203(f) & 213(g) (McKinney 1972).
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to any applicable state statute of limitations and apply'that statute.
Since the alleged fraud occurred in New York, the court properly turned
to the six-year period set forth in CPLR § 213(6).24 Since CPLR § 213(6)
contains a discovery rule,25 it was necessary to apply CPLR § 203(f) as
well.20 Thus, if plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice of
the fraud prior to the two years preceding the action, his claim under
§ 10(b) remained timely27 even though some ten years had elapsed since
the alleged fraud had been committed.
In finding against the plaintiff the district court had taken judicial
notice of the fact that stock market quotations are published daily in
various newspapers28 and held that had the plaintiff been diligent, he
could have discovered the fraud by examining these quotations on the
relevant days.29 The court of appeals disagreed and held that the de-
fendants named were specialists in Superior Oil Stock and hence, could
manipulate both prices on individual transactions and prices on multi-
ple transactions over a period of several days. In short the plaintiff
himself would have had to be a specialist in Superior Oil Stock in order
to uncover the fraud. The issue of whether or not the plaintiff failed
to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud is a question
of fact, and, therefore, summary judgment was an inappropriate
remedy.80
FAILURE TO DIscLoSE MARKET-MAKING IS A 10(b) VIOLATIN
In a recent action, 81 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a failure to disclose market-making activity in an over-the-
24 The New York CPLR provision for actual fraud is contained in § 213(g):
the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from
the time the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud
or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
N.Y. Civ. PAc. § 213(6) (McKinney 1972). For application of a state statute of limitations
in a federal action, see Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
25 The discovery rule allows a plaintiff additional time within which to bring his
action if the wrong is not apparent at the time it is committed. N.Y. Civ. PAc. § 203(f)
(McKinney 1972).
26 CPLR section 203(f) applies to any and all statute of limitations which contain a
discovery rule except for periods of limitation set forth in article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. CPLR § 203(f) provides:
[]here the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from the
time when facts were discovered or from the time when facts could with reason-
able diligence have been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must
be commenced -within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or within
the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause of action ac-
crued, whichever is longer.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 203(f) (McKinney 1963).
27 436 F.2d at 341.
28 See W. RICHAaRSON, THE LAw OF EvIDENcE § 9 (9th ed. J. Prince 1964).
29 436 F.2d at 341.
80 Id. at 341-42.
81 Chasins v. Smith, Barney 8 Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
